United
States Forces Korea (USFK) has an image problem. And, ultimately,
the American and Korean governments are to blame. Military personnel
are caught in the middle between two governments that resemble
more a married couple feuding over the bills than two allies.
Both governments can do more to assist the average service member
and the average Korean to live less contentiously.
For a
minority of Korean citizens, the presence of American military
forces on the southern half of the Korean peninsula (officially
recognized worldwide as the Republic of Korea), proves that their
otherwise sovereign nation has been colonized by murderous thugs
wearing black boots and camouflaged uniforms. But, for most Korean
citizens, most expatriates, and 37,000 American military personnel,
they are just ugly, uneducated, ill-mannered kids, impressed into
a duty, which they only barely understand, deployed toe-to-toe
with the impoverished, missile-toting, anthrax-slinging empire
of North Korea. Its as if Solomon Grundy and Superboy were dividing
the workday between them.
After
reading comments from numerous message boards and chat rooms,
as well as editorials and news articles (pusanweb.com, korea.insights.co.kr,
surfkorea.com, koreaherald.com, koreatimes.com) these past weeks,
it's clear, that a minority of Korean citizens, predominately
young adults, believe, that the American military presence is
detrimental to law and order, insults the Korean Republic,and,
quite possibly, is the major obstacle to peace and political unification
on the Korean peninsula.
It is
forgotten, that there are only 37,000 of these kids deployed in
the most vulnerable spot on the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). Most
will die in the first days of conflict, along with tens of thousands
of their Korean brothers-in-arms and civilians. Most are too scared
to admit, but they would rather be in any other warzone in the
world. They volunteered for money, to get way from home, or to
avoid some other punishment, but not to die in Korea. They all
have plans, and Korea is not a part of those dreams. They are
as much victims as the Koreans and Americans, who have died in
safer parts of the country, they are forced to guard. But, the
average Korean citizen perceives American military and diplomatic
installations, especially the larger ones in urban areas, like
the Yongsan Garrison (Seoul), as fetid islands of 'American-ness'
in a purer ocean of 'Korean-ness'. Perhaps all those crumbling
stonewalls wrapped in rusty, barbed wire and flimsy, corroded
gates around those military reservations give the impression of
exclusivity. No doubt, the sewers, electricity lines, and telephone
connections terminate abruptly at the main gate. Again, all those
Korean men in faded, worn American uniforms and women in suits
and skirts must really be Americans disguised as Korean nationals.
American
military reservations are as much a part of Korea as high-rise
apartments and room salons (dallenjujum). The barracks, sewers,
and roads are made from the same materials as the buildings, sewers,
and roads outside the main gate. The same electricity, water,
and telephone signals flow in and out of both Korean and American
military buildings. And, the same Korean-trained Korean nationals,
men and women, have manned, installed, maintained, repaired, and
inspected these same massive investments of infrastructure for
decades. American military personnel rotate in and out on a yearly
schedule, but the same Koreans and equipment remain.
The Status
Of Forces Agreement (SOFA) requires, that only Korean contractors
build, repair, and inspect Korean-made equipment. Teams of Korean
and American inspectors jointly supervise all projects. Korean
firefighters and office workers, mechanics and restaurant staff
all form a city with the reservation, receiving overtime and holiday
breaks, both American or Korean. Actually, Americans and Koreans
interact more on military reservations than anywhere else in the
world.
This
interaction is governed by SOFA regulations, installation regulations,
informal office and restaurant rules, custom, and personal idiosyncrasies.
Its an international bureaucracy of two groups of citizens, divided
by language and custom. No matter that American regulations and
supervisors supposedly have the final word, but, because of the
Americans' inexperience and dependence, Korean employees informally
control their respective workplaces. Its a junior partner taking
advantage of her partner's dependence. It is Korea and the world
in miniature
Only
in the private institutes (hagwons) do foreign national, including
American, instructors of English associate on a daily basis as
much as they do on the military reservations. But here also Koreans,
students and staff, control the way English is communicated. Through
textbooks, curricula, and exclusion of foreign workers from important
supervisory positions, private institutes package English into
a safe commodity, denuded of culture and character. Most students
avoid controversial discussions, in favor of slang usage
and insipid personal questions. Institute staff rarely speak (or
can) English, and Korean instructors of English are too overworked
to seek improvement beyond the level needed to maintain their
jobs. As in the case of the military installations, the foreign
world is bracketed into a safe zone by bureaucratic regulations,
customs, and language. Ultimately, the root of this defensive
sanitization of the outside world lies in a dysfunctional economy,
nominally one of the most productive in Asia, yet rotted in its
industrial and financial core.
The living
conditions on military reservations reflect the economic health
of the surrounding national and local economies. Actually, the
conditions are worse, especially by the standards of American
military installations stateside and elsewhere. This is a direct
consequence of the economic policies of the successive Korean
governments. Just as Koreans are forced to withstand substandard
sewers, roads, contaminated water and air, and antiquated and
over-burdened electrical and telecommunications systems, American
military personnel likewise suffer through a year of substandard
housing, plumbing, and phone systems.
The interaction
between Korean nationals and American military personnel is also
a reflection of the current political relationship between the
American and Korean governments. The reactive and episodic nature
of the Clinton Administration's foreign policy, combined with
President Clinton's and Secretary of State Albright's respective
and competing quests for a legacy, tossed with the domestic American
fixation on money and personality, places American military personnel
in a foreign country with an antiquated mission and little or
no domestic support. American military personnel feel abandoned
by their superiors to fight a war in a country most Americans
have never heard of.
For most
of a decade, American forces have shuttled from mission to mission,
exercise to home, overseas assignment to stateside, at a dizzying
pace. Most personnel know only that North Korea is the enemy,
but the Clinton Administration has never been able to form and
articulate a coherent Asia policy, that the average kid from some
farming district or ghetto can understand. Instead, soldiers,
sailors, and airmen, these inexperienced, youthful kids forced
into the role of diplomats and professionals in a strange country,
are forced to handle the living stresses on their own. Meanwhile,
their superiors know little and care even less about the customs
and sentiments of the country, to where they temporarily are assigned.
Too many scared kids, too many useless officers, too little support
from the government.
USFK
is like any other multinational corporation operating in a hostile
environment, e.g. McDonald's in France. Only, soldiers have to
worry about a civilian population, which they are supposedly defending,
that might attack it, instead of the enemy. The official announcement
of the re-assignment of Lt. General Petrosky to Europe is a good,
first step, but USFK needs an executive, who is more competent
at public relations. USFK needs to articulate a mission, to communicate
to the average Korean man and woman (especially,the X-Gener's),
that does not rely on memories of the Korean War. USFK needs to
stress its role as a progressive force in Korean politics and
economics. It needs to assist local communities more. And, finally,
it needs to reduce the number of installations and command staff,
including the scale-down and closure of the Yongsan Garrison in
Seoul.
American
SOFA negotiators should not budge on the issue of legal jurisdiction.
Relinquishing legal rights would seriously undermine morale in
the ranks, and might compromise the retention of skilled military
personnel, especially those individuals most needed in Korea and
in other government venues. Asia has always been the lost child
of American foreign policy, and the current lack of qualified
experts has contributed to the present incompetence. Furthermore,
compromising American service members' legal rights will not bring
the dead, whether American or Korean, back to life. Concrete reforms
will let them rest in dignity.
For its
part, the Korean government needs to initiate one of the most
massive public works projects ever seen. It needs to improve its
waste disposal system, reclaim rivers and coastal areas from pollution,
improve its electricity and telecommunications networks, augment
its transportation system, and rezone and rebuild its major urban
areas, reducing its reliance on its agricultural sector. However,
reforms within the industrial and banking sectors will soak up
funding for the short term, and may necessitate international
loans.
What
hinders these reforms is not one side or the other, but how the
American and Korean governments interact. The Korean government
manipulates the Americans, to gain financial support without any
accompanying advice. The American government seeks the best deal
it can get. Koreans need to interact with the outside world, not
in a defensive mode, rather dictating why Korea should matter.
Korea has to communicate to the world, why anyone should take
it seriously, but not braggardly and foolishly. There is no hope
for a sovereign, financially-secure Korea outside the Japan-US
alliance. And a reunified Korea will be even more dependent on
the world for generous loans.
USFK
is not only the agent of American policy, which means it is also
a agent of Korean policy (as far as Korea is an ally of the US),
but America's frontline salesperson. USFK was an integral part
of the South Korean economic miracle; it can be a part of the
next phase of development and eventual North-South unification.
But it has been ill-served and undermined by both the American
and Korean governments. It needs a new mission. One that
soldiers, sailors, and airmen can do. One that a kid can do.
We want to hear what you think of our
advertisers. For Information about our advertising policies and rates
or to offer feedback about one of our sponsors, please visit our Sponsorship
Page