North
Korea has been an international drama since its inception,
and after half a century it is natural to feel jaded
with adrenalin overload. Certainly many South Koreans
seem to have learned to live with the rhetoric of metropolitan
Seoul (22 million people) being turned into 'a sea of
fire', if they pick a fight with comrades in the north.
They are generally more concerned that ramping up the
drama in the north will be bad for business, both personal
and national. That's easy to sneer at from the comfort
of another continent, but it is a genuine and immediate
worry for South Koreans, and the true meaning behind
polls which show that they overwhelmingly "fear Washington
more the Pyeongyang". Experience has taught them from
the first days of American post World War II administration
on the peninsular that American ignorance can be deadly.
Economics
is also the reason than most thinking South Koreans
are extremely wary about rapid reintegration with North
Korea. They believe with every justification that the
sudden collapse of the North Korean regime would leave
them with an economic and social disaster on their hands,
a disaster which would set back Korean development for
at least a generation. Few people, least of all South
Korean leaders of any political persuasion, have illusions
about the distasteful leadership in the North, but to
varying degrees they prefer to buy that leadership off
in the hope of coaxing the Northern economy into a less
catastrophic state, and eventually absorbing it. For
somewhat different reasons, this also seems to be the
game plan of the Chinese leadership.
It
is rare to see anything written about North Korea, or
by North Koreans, which does not adopt a moral perspective.
In a state so polarized from the community of nations
that is probably inevitable, and like everyone else
I am more or less unable to view North Korean society
without wearing the moral cloak of my own understanding.
The antidote to moral outrage is, of course, realpolitik,
but this is often more illusory than real. Illusory
because 'rational' judgement is a product of the premises
we apply to a problem and those premises, through ignorance
or willful choice, are rarely neutral. Where realpolitik
can have predictive value perhaps is in trying to decode
what might look like 'realpolitik' to various players.
With this in mind, we might perceive that the 'pragmatic'
incentives in the North Korean equation seem rather
different to folk in Pyeongyang, Washington. Beijing,
Moscow, Tokyo, and of course, Seoul.
From
where I sit, it is difficult not to feel that the North
Korean saga is approaching some kind of end-game. That
is not rational to contemplate for Seoul or Beijing.
We get the feeling that Pyeongyang, which is concerned
above all with regime preservation rather than reform,
has a leadership which is running in smaller and smaller
mental circuits. Maybe sooner than later, that has to
mean some rash action against external 'enemies', or
an internal coup, or both. The American take on this
North Korean malady tends to fixate the media. We have
seen all too clearly that the current administration
in Washington has a visceral contempt for diplomacy
over their version of realpolitik. However, even Washington
feels constrained on the North Korean issue because
of the problems pre-emptive action will create with
China, Russia and South Korea. North Korea's stupid
missile threats, especially talk of ICBMs reaching the
American west coast, could swing American politics to
some kind of military action on Korea. The big sleeper
though is realpolitik as seen from Japan.
The
Japanese public feels directly threatened by North Korean
missiles. When that is added to a nuclear threat the
imperatives for any Japanese government become overwhelming.
The moral dimension in Japanese-Korean relationships
(North or South) is potent on both sides, and can be
rapidly swung behind support for violent action. There
are strong historical reasons for this moral passion,
but the pragmatic importance is that it exists as a
political tool. The ordinary Japanese public is outraged
by what they see as the betrayal of Koizumi's groundbreaking
visit to North Korea last year, and the perfidious treatment
of Japanese abductees (regardless that Japan did it's
best to extinguish Korea as a nation and a culture from
1910 to 1945). Internally, Japan is in a state of economic
paralysis and self-recrimination after the heady days
of the 1980s. The more nationalistic wing of the Japanese
polity feels castrated by the American security umbrella.
In
short, to many the current North Korean nuclear charade
could be a beacon of hope for the reassertion of Japanese
self-respect.
I
would not be surprised to see a pre-emptive strike by
Japan on North Korean nuclear and missile facilities**.
Washington would know about it in advance, and be pleased.
It would give Washington a free pass out of a diplomatic
impasse. Seoul would be hysterical, but couldn't do
much. In fact, by holding the North Koreans' hands in
sympathy, they would make it that much harder for Kim
Jong-il and his cohorts to follow through with the 'sea
of fire' threat. Beijing would be secretly relieved
on one level, but be appalled by pending disintegration
in the North, and like Moscow hold dark memories of
Japanese militaristic hubris after the Russo-Japanese
War of 1904-1905. As for the outcome on internal North
Korean politics, that would turn on power plays amongst
the leadership there, which we don't know about. We
guess that at the moment Kim Jong-il is holding a rather
inept balance between the military, party traditionalists
and reformers. What might emerge when the card deck
is split is anybody's guess.
Postscripts
:
1.
**
I was unaware that leading figures in Japan had begun
to express precisely these sentiments at the very moment
I was writing. For example, see this report
in the Sydney Morning Herald.
2.
Egg-on-face Time : After being reprinted in the
Asia Times, this commentary somehow wound up on a Yahoo
news link. The increased exposure led to a number of
responses, some blustering, some interested. However,
a couple of the most useful pointed out that at the
moment the Japanese Self Defense Force actually lacked
the strategic capability to launch a pre-emptive strike
against North Korea. Here is one comment by a reader
:
"I don't doubt Japan's technical
military, or organizational prowess. Their Air Force
is an excellent air superiority and self-defense force.
I have no doubt that they could defeat any air armada
in the region in air-to-air combat. But as far as I
know, they are not equipped or trained for effective
strategic or tactical ground-support bombing operations,
thereby making any threat of a pre-emptive strike simple
bluff. They have the wrong type of F-15s for that, and
the lead time necessary to develop the capability is
simply too long." Kevin Widlansky
"If North Korea said it was going
to turn us into a sea of fire and were about to load
their missiles with fuel, Japan would start to consider
whether North Korea had started an attack," said
[Japanese Defense Minister] Ishiba, trying to defuse
his explosive rhetoric.
Even Robyn Lim, professor of International
Relations at Nagoya University, usually in favor of
a tough line toward North Korea, fears that Ishiba might
have leaned too far out of the window. "His statement
doesn't help matters because it is not a credible threat.
Japan doesn't have aircraft capable of attacking North
Korea and returning home," Lim wrote.
Japan's defense establishment hopes
that won't be true for much longer. By 2005, a couple
of US-made in-flight-refueling aircraft will become
part of the Japanese air force, allowing it to operate
farther from home.
For now, however, Japanese Aegis high-tech
destroyers, currently cruising in the Sea of Japan conducting
"anti-North Korea drills", as Japan's Yomiuri
Shimbun reports, would not even be able to shoot down
incoming rogue missiles. "The ability of Aegis
cruisers to actually shoot down missiles at this time
is zero, since Japan's missiles on the Aegis vessels
are not yet configured and developed for missile defense.
It will need US assistance to shoot down anything at
all," Hughes said.
3.
Here is a good current review (27 February 2003) of the
best way to handle the North Korean issue in the short
term : "Talk
to Pyongyang Now, US Told", Jim Lobe, Asian Times.
As usual (sigh) the main roadblock is George W. Bush's
kitchen cabinet...
"North Korea - The Japanese
Card"... copyrighted to Thor May 2003; all rights reserved
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